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Can Informed Consent Preserve the Integrity of Mediation?
by Maureen E.Laflin'
Some erroneously view the ADR spectrum as a number line
where each form of ADR occupies a clearly marked independent
position. A better analogy is that of the lines of a color spectrum,
such that every ADR method can be understood only in relation
to the others into which it blends and fades. Mediation is one
form of ADR. At its core, "mediation" has been defined as "a
voluntary process in which a neutral third party, who lacks
authority to impose a solution, helps the participants reach their
own agreement for resolving a dispute or planning a transaction."' By contrast, "neutral evaluation" is a separate ADR
"process in which the parties present their dispute before a neutral expert and receive an unprejudiced assessment of their
case." Yet there are those who describe themselves as "evaluative
mediators" We err, and we disserve the entire spectrum of ADR
processes, if we come to view the whole spectrum as merely
mediation in a variety of forms and orientations.
Mediation is paradigmatically a facilitative process, whereby
the parties strive to achieve a voluntary agreement that resolves
the dispute to at least the partial satisfaction of all. Law is an
adversarial process that by design creates winners and losers by
imposing outcomes upon the parties. Skills as advocates and
problem-solvers which well serve lawyers and their clients in the
traditional legal system have the potential to alter and perhaps
co-opt the more facilitative process of classic mediation. Parties
to a mediation, consciously or unconsciously, may attribute a
special competence or status to a lawyer-mediator, notwithstanding the respect they hold for their own counsel. These
tendencies vest dual professionals, such as attorney-mediators,
with the power to dominate and control the parties and the ultimate resolution of the dispute.
While bright-line distinctions between the various ADiZ
processes are difficult, some boundaries are needed if the
integrity of each process is to be protected. The focus of the
debate about whether a practice properly constitutes mediation,
or some other form of ADR, should be directed, explicitly and
narrowly, toward the two basic premises of mediation: participant
self-determination and mediator impartiality. Once a third party
neutral advocates that the parties see the dispute in a particular
light, that light becomes the beacon that directs the pathway
through the remainder of the mediation, compromising both the
parties' self-determination and the mediator's impartiality. If the
mediator's conduct gives him or her power and control over the
outcome, then he or she is actually doing that which he or she has
been given no authority to do, and the dispute resolution process
at issue is no longer mediation but something much more akin to
neutral evaluation or settlement conferencing. If the mediator
allows him- or herself to become the central character, participant self-determination is subverted and an essential
characteristic of mediation is lost.
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I do not mean to suggest that evaluation should be prohibited;
nor, in fact, do I regard all evaluative or directive techniques as
"bad." In many situations, a third party neutral with an evaluative
orientation will be more effective and more to the parties' liking
than a strictly facilitative neutral. But any sound dispute resolution program must include assurances that tile parties involved in
each matter share a common understanding about the nature of
the process they are purchasing, and assurances that they will
actually receive the product they have purchased. Properly
labeling the process and clearly communicating its parameters to
the parties helps ensure mutual understanding, for both the parties and practitioners.
Effective January 1, 2000, Virginia became the first state to
adopt Rules of Professional Conduct for lawycrs that unequivocally and specifically address the conduct of lawyers acting as
third party neutrals and mediators.' The Virginia rules are significant not only because they mark the first attempt by a state to
specifically address the practice of mediation by lawyers, but
also because they confront head-on the divisive issue of"evaluation" in the mediation context. The drafters of the Virginia rules
thoroughly debated the issue of evaluation. The drafters wanted
to provide guidelines or boundaries without tying the hands of
mediation practitioners. Viewing mediation as an evolving profession that requires flexibility, they declined to require
mediation practitioners to strictly adhere to a facilitative model.
Virginia crafted a "delicate compromise" in order to reconcile
consumer demand with the available spectrum of ADR
processes. The goal was to better serve the consumers.
Virginia did not emphasize "labeling" the processes, as such,
and adopted a pragmatic, rather than theory-bound, approach.
Acknowledging that many parties do want evaluation and that
many lawyer-mediators give them what they want, the Virginia
rules assert that while facilitation lies at the core, and is the preferred mode of mediation, the practice allows for a good measure
of evaluative activity. Thus Virginia conceptualizes "evaluation"
as a tool that can be deployed during mediation, rather than a separate process. While Virginia gives a decided preference to the
facilitative mode, and requires the identification to the consumer
of the pitfalls associated with evaluations, its "delicate compromise" seeks to buttress the integrity of such mediation by
requiring a foundation of informed consent.
Virginia places restrictions on evaluative techniques designed
to protect the essential, facilitative purpose of the mediation
process. Under Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
2.1 1(d), evaluation may play only a supportive, secondary role:
A lawyer-mediator may offer evaluation of, for example,
strengths and weaknesses of positions, assess the value and cost
of alternatives to settlement or assess the barriers to settlement
(collectively referred to as evaluation) only if such evaluation is

incidental to the facilitative role and does not interfere with
the lawyer-mediator's impartiality or the self-determination of
the parties.

Lawyer-mediators in Virginia have no ethical duty to insure
that mediation remains purely facilitative. They may ethically
participate in the transition of a mediation process into something else-an evaluative process-provided the consumer gives
informed consent. Since lawyer-mediators in Virginia must
inform all parties to a mediation that evaluative techniques have
significant drawbacks and will only be used if requested by all
sides," tile Virginia rules may work to ensure that evaluation will
be employed sparingly, and under the guise of a supplement to
the facilitative process.
Under Virginia's approach, the integrity of the ADR process
depends on the sufficiency of the consent. Unfortunately,
numerous questions surround the workability of the State's
"informed consent" requirement.
The firm demand set forth in the Virginia rules that a mediator secure in writing the informed consent of all parties before
commencing any evaluative activities represents a fair start, for it
ostensibly curtails the mediator's power by ensuring that the parties are not taken unawares by a shift in orientation in a
mediation. Yet, it belies experience to think that most parties to
mediation will readily understand the differences, especially
when they learn of them in the charged atmosphere of an
ongoing process. Thus, here is a danger that the transition into
evaluative mode represents a "bait and switch" for the mediation
consumer. Far less of a risk exists if the informed consent is
obtained prior to beginning mediation, but injecting evaluation

The comment to Rule 2.11 (d) explains that lawyer-mediators
are prohibited from offering legal advice to any of the parties
(noting that this is a function of the lawyer who is representing a
client), or from using coercive techniques.' The rule does authorize lawyer-mediators to give legal information on the ground
that doing so "is an educational function which aids the parties
in making informed decisions. 6 The rule also permits the mediator to dispense legal information on the notion of "informed
consent." The hope is that, so educated, the principle of selfdetermination is advanced rather than compromised if the parties
decide to have the mediator use a more evaluative style.
Prior to commencing a mediation, lawyer-mediators in
Virginia must discuss with prospective parties the general nature
of mediation. They must divulge their personal style, approach,
and subject-matter expertise, while eliciting the parties' expectations about the mediation process. Furthermore, they must
explain the limitations that are inherent in the use of evaluation.
The parties' expectations and understandings must be memorialized in writing in the agreement to mediate. The rule concludes
emphasizing party choice-"A lawyer-mediator shall conduct
the mediation in a manner that is consistent with the parties'choice and expectations.'
The comment section to the Virginia rule further stresses disclosure and the importance of
the parties' full understanding as to the risks
associated with evaluation. Comment Three
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into the process at the outset may conflict
with the rule's stated preference for facilitation.
The care, depth, and subtlety with
which the mediation parties will be
"informed" is likely to vary by mediator.
Neither the parties nor the mediator may
comprehend fully the impact evaluation
will have on the process at the time consent is sought. Where mediation proceeds
by caucus, the evaluative data provided to
each party may vary widely. Virginia's
rule is silent as to the mediator's duty to
obtain explicit consent to give different
evaluative content to each litigant. It is
doubtful that the consumer litigant understands that the evaluative mediator may
selectively dole out legal advice and legal
information to one side or the other in an
attempt to get the case settled. Few mediators are this candid with the parties,
Parties to such a "mediation" should question whether they purchased the same
product - one side received the benefit
of the mediator's expertise while the other
received a settlement. Maybe that is what
each side wanted, but shouldn't the parties
be allowed to make that decision?
Labeling the process and clearly communicating its parameters to the parties helps
ensure mutual understanding and
increases the likelihood that the parties
and the mediator are buying and selling
the same product.
Finally, we must acknowledge that as
mediation becomes more and more commonplace, and the parties to mediation
and their lawyers increasingly sophisticated about the process, evaluative
techniques may well come back to haunt
the unwary mediator who finds him- or
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herself prey to the skilled lawyer or astute
party. An experienced litigator who regularly refers and represents his clients in
mediations not long ago confided in me
that he plays "spin the mediator" whenever a mediator begins to exhibit directive,
evaluative tendencies. His game of spinning the mediator has as its goal
convincing the evaluative mediator of the
correctness of his client's position, and
then sitting back as the mediator advocates on his client's behalf. In this
scenario, the focus of the mediation shifts
away from the parties, and the energy of
the mediation is misdirected. The unwary
mediator, the other parties, and impartiality itself, are the likely victims.
Judges evaluate, and then enter
orders. Mediation is a developing alternative dispute resolution process. The
"activist," directive evaluator is not a
mediator, at least not in the traditional
sense. And while tradition alone may not
be a good reason to curb the evaluative
temptation in mediation practice, the fact
that professional habit inclines attorneymediators toward an evaluative
orientation is not a sound reason for
giving evaluation a foothold within the
true mediation process.
I am reminded of the introduction of
kudzu in the Southern states during the
first part of the twentieth century. Brought
in from Asia to curtail erosion, the hairy
kudzu vines have taken over much of the
rural landscape. Likewise, importing evaluative techniques into the traditionally
facilitative process of mediation may well
lead to those techniques coming to dominate the process, contributing to the
demise of purely facilitative mediation as
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an alternative to other dispute resolution
processes. While Virginia and others
argue that it is too late to rein in evaluative
techniques employed in mediation, I disagree. And while Virginia has tried to pave
an ethical way for lawyer-mediators who
engage in hybrid processes, a better path
must be found.
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